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CHANGE OF PAYEE'S NAME

RIGHT OF RECOVERY OF PAYMENT BY DRAWEE

A check, drawn payable to "Geismar & Co., was unlawfully
altered to read "Gelsmar & Co." and was deposited in the latter's
account with the defendant depositary bank. The depositary
bank, guaranteeing prior endorsements, forwarded the check to
a presenting bank, which, after likewise guaranteeing endorsements, presented the check to the plaintiff drawee bank. The
check was paid, and the drawer's account charged. When the
intended payee Geismar inquired about payment on the original
obligation, National Gypsum Corporation, the drawer, which
had not noticed the alteration, immediately returned the check
to the drawee bank, requesting reimbursement. The drawee
bank complied, and on the following day sent the check to the
presenting bank wit ha request for reinstatement to its account.
The presenting bank in turn forwarded the check to the defendant depositary bank. Thereafter, the drawee bank instituted
suit against both the presenting bank and the depositary bank;
the presenting bank filed a third party demand against the depositary bank seeking indemnity for any liability resulting from
the drawee bank's demand. Later, the defendant banks agreed
that any loss should be borne solely by the depositary bank. The
trial court held that payment of the check, even in its altered
form, discharged the instrument, and thus relieved both the
defendant endorsers of liability.1 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal reversed. Held, payment of an uncertified
check upon which the payee's name has been altered is a case
not provided for in the NIL 2 and under the rules of the law
merchant the drawee bank is entitled to recover for restitution
of money paid under a mistake of fact. Manufacturers & Traders
Trust Co. v. Bank of Louisiana, 167 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964), writs denied, 247 La. 247, 170 So. 2d 508 (1965)
("no error of law").
-1.Alternatively, the trial court holding was based on a theory that the plain
tiff failed to give timely notice of dishonor. On appeal, the court held that notice
was timely under either the Negotiable Instruments Law or the law merchant,

since the drawee had given notice as soon as the alteration was discovered. 167
So. 2d at 387.

Further consideration of this point is beyond the scope of this

Note.
2. In this Note the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law will be referred to
as the NIL. The NIL was adopted in Louisiana by La. Acts 1904, No. 64, and

now appears in title 7 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. Though references in
this Note will be to the Uniform Law, the section numbering is the same in the
Louisiana enactment.
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At common law, the drawee of a materially altered instrument,3 whether certified by him or not, was generally permitted
to recover the money paid thereupon from the person receiving
payment 4 by application of the quasi contract rule permitting
recovery of money paid under a mutual mistake of fact.5 An
exception to this broad rule has been the doctrine of Price v.
Neal,6 by which the drawee of a check who pays an instrument
which bears the forged signature of the drawer is denied the
right to recover the money so paid. Analogy to the rule of
Price v. Neal was inapplicable to the drawee of a materially
altered instrument.7 If a check was altered to appear payable
for a greater sum than originally intended, the drawee could
charge the drawer only to the extent of the "original tenor" of
the instrument," but could recover the excess from the party who
had presented the item for payment, no matter how negligent
the drawee may have been in making the payment.9 However,
there was authority indicating that a drawee may not recover
the proceeds of a materially altered instrument from an agent
collecting bank, known to be such, which had received payment
and remitted the proceeds to its principal prior to notice of the
fraud.'0
3. A
payable,
medium
removal

material alteration is any alteration which changes the date, the sum
the time or place of payment, the number or relations of the parties, the
cr currency in which payment is to be made, or any other addition or
of any part which alters the effect of the instrument as signed. See
UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 125; Of. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 3-407. Changing the name of the payee is a material alteration. Hammond
State Bank v. Strawberry Growers' Ass'n, 162 La. 27, 110 So. 77 (1926) ; Alford
v. Delatte, 160 La. 712, 107 So. 500 (1926).
4. Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 604 (1873) ; Merchants'
Bank v. Exchange Bank, 16 La. 457 (1840) ; Marine Nat'l Bank v. National City
Bank, 59 N.Y. 67 (1874) ; Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 N.Y. 230 (1850) ;
BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 140 (2d ed. 1961) ; contra, Louisiana Nat'l Bank
v. Citizens' Bank, 28 La. Ann. 189 (1876). Although the opinion in the latter
case is not persuasive and was not followed prior to the adoption of the NIL,
it clearly stands for the proposition that a drawee who has accepted a check
for a raised amount may not ".'ecover the payment made thereon from an innocent holder who took the check after acceptance.
5. See note 4 supra.
6. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). The rule of Price v. Neal
was generally adopted by common law in the United States. See cases cited in
BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 133, n.5 (2d ed. 1961).
7. See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 140 (2d ed. 1961); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 917 (Beutel's 7th ed. 1948).
8. See Dunbar v. Armor, 5 Rob. 1 (La. 1843) ; Hall v. Fuller, 5 B. & C. 750,
108 Eng. Rep. 279 (1826) ; BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 132 (2d ed. 1961).
9. National Bank of Commerce v. National Mechanics' Banking Ass'n, 55
N.Y. 211. (1873) ; City Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 Tex. 203 (1876) ; Bank
of Williston v. Alderman, 106 S.C. 386, 91 S.E. 296 (1917).
10. See Crocker-Woolworth Nat'l Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Cal. 564, 73 Pac.
456 (1903) ; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Corpus Christi Nat'l' Bank, 186 S.W.2d
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Experience under the NIL concerning materially altered instruments discloses much uncertainty. Section 124 contains the
general principles: alteration of a check in a material aspect
renders the check void except against one who makes, authorizes
or assents to the alteration and those who endorse the check
after the alteration is made." A holder in due course can enforce
the altered check against one who became a party prior to the
alteration only in accordance with the form in which the check
was originally issued.

2

Since certification of a check is equivalent to an acceptance, 8
it brings into operation section 62 which provides: "[T] he acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will pay it
according to the tenor of his acceptance," and "the acceptor...
admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to endorse." In two forceful decisions' 4 it was decided that section 62
840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (bank which had paid a raised check could not recover from a prior collecting bank which had remitted the proceeds of the check
to its transferor) ; cf. Citizens Bank v. Commercial Say. Bank, 209 Ala. 280, 96
So. 324 (1923).
The reason for this exception seems to have been that the collecting bank, as
agent for the holder, in remitting to its principal prior to notice of the improper
payment, had changed its position in reliance on the payment. The rule resulted
in banks requiring guarantees of all prior endorsements. See National Park
Bank v. Seaboard Bank, 114 N.Y. 28, 20 N.E. 632 (1889) ; FARNSWORTH, NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 147 (1959) ; note 24 infra.
11. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 124. It has been said that
§ 124 does not settle the question on the ground it applies only to an acceptance
prior to the alteration. BRANNAN, NEGOTIBLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 917 (Beutel's
7th ed. 1948). This position has been criticized as incorrect on the following
reasoning. The express language of § 124 makes the altered instrument void except
as to the parties expressly mentioned. Since the subsequent acceptor is not mentioned, the alteration avoids the check as to him. See Greeley, The Effect of Acceptance of an Altered Bill, 27 ILL. L. REv. 519, 521 (1933) ; see also BRITTom,
BILLS AND NOTES § 140 (2d ed. 1961).
12. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 124; see Commonwealth Bank

v. Dunn, 335 Mich. 665, 57 N.W.2d 294 (1953) ; see also Ozark Sav. Bank v.
Bank of Bradleyville, 204 S.W. 570 (Mo. App. 1918) ; of. Miles City Bank v.
Askin, 119 Mont. 581, 179 P.2d 750 (1947).
13. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 187: "Where a check is certi-

fied by the bank on which it is drawn, the certification is equivalent to an acceptance."
14. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4
P.2d 781 (1931) (thief stole a check, erased the payee's name and inserted his
own, then had the check certified; it was subsequently negotiated to a holder in
due course to whom it was paid; held, the drawee may not recover from the innocent holder, for by his acceptance he engaged to pay according to the tenor of
the check at the time of its acceptance) ; National City Bank v. National Bank
of the Republic, 300 Ill. 102, 132 N.E. 832 (1921) (court refused to allow a
certifying bank to recover the payment made to an innocent purchaser who became such after acceptance of a check altered as to the payee's name prior to
acceptance) ; see also Cherokee Nat'l Bank v. Union Trust Co., 33 Okla. 342,
125 Pac. 464 (1912) (dictum).
Although the case was decided prior to the enactment of the NIL, the decision
in Louisiana Nat'l Bank v. Citizens' Bank, 28 La. Ann. 189 (1876), seems to
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had changed the prior law with respect to recovery by the drawee

of money paid to the holder of a materially altered certified
check and that section 62 should be interpreted to mean that cer-

tification bound the drawee " 'according to the tenor of his
acceptance' at the time of his acceptance or certification."' 5
Thus if a bank certifies a materially altered check and the check
finds its way into the hands of a holder in due course, the bank
will not be allowed to recover a payment made thereon to the
holder. However, the drawee's right to restitution exists
whether or not he certified the instrument in its altered form,
if the certification was after purchase by the holder who receives
payment. 16 The position that section 62 has changed the prior
law with respect to the right of the drawee of a materially altered check, subsequently certified and negotiated to a holder in
due course, to recover payment thereon made to such holder,
has been sharply criticized, 1'7 principally by reference to the law
merchant, that the certifying bank was never deemed to have
admitted the genuineness of the signature of the payee.' 8 While
it might be argued that this rule of the law merchant applied
indicate that Louisiana would take the same position with respect to a check
certified after alteration, in the hands of an innocent purchaser who took the
check after certification.
15. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 165,
4 P.2d 781, 785 (1931).
16. National Reserve Bank v. Corn Exch. Bank, 171 App. Div. 195, 157 N.Y.
Supp. 316 (1916) ; see RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTIONS § 31 (1937). This rule has
been adopted by the Uniform Commercial Code. Uniform Commercial Code
§ 3-417(1) and comment 5.
17. BrtITroN, BILLS AND NOTES § 140 (2d ed. 1961). Britton argues that
the expression "tenor of acceptance" had been used by authorities long before
the NIL and had never been construed to mean tenor of the instrument at the
time of acceptance. Further, other sections of the NIL tend to support the view
that the phrase means the same in § 62 as it did at common law. For example,
§ 132 defines acceptance as "the signification by the drawee of his assent to the
order of the drawer." It seems obvious that acceptance means assent to the actual
order of the drawer and not as it appears under the forgery. See BIGELow, BILLS,
NOTES AND CHECKS § 197a, n.2 (3d ed. 1928) ; Greeley, The Effect of Acceptance
of an Altered Bill, 27 ILL. L. REV. 519 (1933) ; Notes, 22 COLUM. L. RaV. 260
(1922), 40 YALE L.J. 1106 (1931).
18. See White v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 64 N.Y. 316 (1876). It seems arguable to contend that by the acceptor's admission of the existence of the "payee"
he is not admitting the existence of one who is not only not the true payee, but
who is also a nonholder of the instrument. Note, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 260 (1922).
The rule has found continued expression even after enactment of the NIL.
See, e.g., Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 112 N.J.L. 550, 557,
172 Atl. 45, 49 (1934), where the court, after quoting § 62, said: "The plain
language of the section clearly indicates that the acceptance of a draft does not
admit the genuineness of the payee's signature. It merely admits the existence of
the payee and his then capacity to endorse. There was a payer who had capacity
to endorse, and, since it is clear that he did not endorse, hence his purported
endorsement necessarily was a forgery." See also BRITTON, BILLS AND NoTEs
§ 139 (2d ed. 1961).
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only to forgeries of the true payee's signature, and not to in-

sertion of the thief's name as payee in the body of the check,
it is formulated so as to encompass also all forgeries in the body
of the check. 19 If the law merchant rule that the drawee may
recover payments on altered checks has been changed by section 62, it would seem that the whole of the rule should have
been changed. Since section 62 does not attempt to deal with

uncertified checks, the anomalous result follows that the bank
which pays a materially altered check may recover the payment

only if the check was not certified. 20 One answer to the anomaly
is found in the recent case, Kansas Bankers Sur. Co. v. Ford

County State Bank,2' which held that payment was tantamount
to certification of a check, thus importing into the area of uncertified checks the section 62 rule for certified checks.
In the instant case the defendant depositary bank contended
that the payment by the drawee bank was at least equivalent to
certification by it, and consequently by application of section 62,

plaintiff, as an acceptor, engaged to pay according to the tenor
of its acceptance at the time of its acceptance and admitted the
existence of the payee and its then capacity to endorse. In holding for plaintiff, the court specifically rejected the reasoning of
Kansas Bankers Sur. Co. v. Ford County State Bank as unsound.

The court reasoned that certification was an act distinguishable
from mere payment, and contemplated further negotiation of
the instrument, whereas payment ended the life of the instrument. 22 Thus finding section 62 inapplicable to the case of pay19. See White v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 64 N.Y. 316, 320 (1876): "The
plaintiffs, as drawees of the bill, were only held to a knowledge of the signature
of their correspondents, the drawers; by accepting and paying the bill they only
vouched for the genuineness of such signatures, and were not held to a knowledge
of the want of genuineness of any other part of the instrument, or of any other
names appearing thereon, or of the title of the holder." (Emphasis added.) ; Canal
Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill (N.Y.) 287, 289 (1841) : "Neither acceptance nor
payment, at any time, nor under any circumstances, is an admission that the
first, or any other indorser's name is genuine."
20. See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 141 (2d ed. 1961).
21. 184 Kan. 529, 338 P.2d 309 (1959) ; but of. McLendon v. Bank of Advance, 188 Mo. App. 417, 174 S.W. 203 (1915), where the court cited § 62 and
followed the rule of Price v. Neal as to checks to which the drawer's names were
forged, but as to genuine uncertified checks on which the amounts had been
raised after issue, the court held § 62 did not apply to prevent the drawee from
recovering its payment thereon.
22. 167 So. 2d at 385; accord, First Nat'l Bank v. Whitman, 94 U.S. 343
(1876) ; M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 159 La.
752, 106 So. 292 (1925) ; Bell-Wayland Co. v. Bank of Sugden, 95 Okla. 67, 218
Pac. 705 (1923) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Brule Nat'l Bank, 41 S.D. 87, 168 N.W.
1054 (1918) ; Lone Star Trucking Co. v. City Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 240 S.W.
1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; cf. Howard & Preston v. Mississippi Valley Bank,
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ment of an uncertified materially altered check, the court reasoned that the law merchant applied13 and allowed recovery.
Although the court stated that its conclusion was supported by

several theories, 24 it placed the greatest emphasis on the principle of law which allows recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact.25 The court pointed out that its specific holding
2
had found favor in the early Louisiana jurisprudence.

28 La. Ann. 727 (1876) ; Security State Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank,
199 So. 472 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940) ; Consolidated Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l
Bank, 129 App. Div. 538, 114 N.Y. Supp. 308 (1908), aff'd 199 N.Y. 516, 92
N.E. 1081 (1909) ; First Nat'l Bank v. United States Nat'l Bank, 100 Ore. 264,
197 Pac. 547 (1921); National Bank of Commerce v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 109
Wash. 669, 187 Pac. 342 (1920). A critical reading of these cases tends to convince the reader that the courts were using the expression "acceptance" in its
nontechnical sense, meaning simply "honored."
Contra, Pickle v. Muse, 88 Tenn. 380, 12 S.W. 919 (1890).
See also Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 1356, 97 Eng. Rep. 871, 872 (K.B. 1762),
where Lord Mansfield said: "But the plaintiff's case is much stronger upon the
other bill which was not accepted. It is not stated 'that that bill was accepted
before it was negotiated'; on the contrary, the consideration for it was paid by
the defendant, before the plaintiff had seen it. So that the defendant took it
upon the credit of the indorsers, not upon the credit of the plaintiff."
In the instant case defendants had argued that payment by the plaintiff discharged the instrument, and relieved the endorsers of liability under NIL §§ 119
and 120. The court engaged in some dubious reasoning in finding that NIL
§ 119(1), providing that an "instrument is discharged . . . by payment in due
course by or on behalf of the principal debtor," was inapplicable. The court reasoned that since the drawer was not liable on the altered instrument, the drawee
could not have made payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor.
It appears that the true reason the drawee's act did not discharge the instrument
is that the payment which will discharge the instrument is a technical concept
by which payment can be made only to a holder. It seems axiomatic that the
defendant presenting bank was not a holder, as § 23 provides that when a signature is made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to
be, it is wholly inoperative, and gives the possessor of the instrument no rights
therein. See Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Vuci, 224 La. 124, 68 So. 2d 781 (1953);
BarrToN, BILLS AND NOTES §§ 142, 147 (2d ed. 1961).
23. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 196: "In any case not provided
for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall govern."
24. It is submitted that the court failed to base its decision upon the most
expedient theory. Both defendants endorsed the check in question. "Pay to the
order of Any Bank, Banker or Trust Company, All Prior Indorsements Guaranteed." Where this customary manner of forwarding is used, this guarantee of
genuineness of all prior endorsements puts into express form the implied warranty
of genuineness of prior endorsements imposed by NIL §§ 65 and 66. The words
of guarantee, when added to the endorsement, may be construed as imposing a
guarantee or warranty to the drawee. Although the decision could be rendered
upon either the quasi-contractual obligation of restitution of money paid when
not due or upon the guarantee, the latter seems less controversial. See BRITTON,
BILLS AND NOTES § 139 (2d ed. 1961) ; FARNSWORTH, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
147 (1959).
25. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2301, 2302 (1870).
26. In Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Vuci, 224 La. 124, 68 So. 2d 781 (1953), seven
checks were drawn, one upon the plaintiff, and six on other banks, payable to
Mill & Quarry Equipment Co. An agent of the payee forged his employer's endorsement and cashed them with the defendant, his bookmaker. The plaintiff paid
the defendant the sum represented by each check, including the one on which it
was drawn. When the forgery was detected the plaintiff made good the six other
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It is not certain whether Louisiana, under the NIL, will permit the drawee, which has certified a materially altered check
and subsequently paid it to a holder in due course who became
such after certification, to have restitution of the mistaken payment.27 Although there has been considerable criticism of decisions in jurisdictions which hold that the drawee who has certified a materially altered instrument and subsequently paid it
cannot recover from the holder in due course, 28 the position is
supported by certain policy considerations: as between them the

innocent drawee-acceptor is in a better position than the innocent
holder to protect himself against loss by using the qualified

acceptance, special paper for easy detection of alterations, or
forgery insurance ;29 and if the loss is to fall on two innocent
parties, the law will place it upon the one whose actions enabled
the loss to occur, in this case, certification by the drawee3 0

Moreover, both the Restatement of Restitution5 ' and the Unichecks and brought suit on all seven. It was held that plaintiff could recover all
sums paid as money paid under a mistake of fact, the court citing article 2301
of the Civil Code as authority.
In Merchants Bank v. Exchange Bank, 16 La. 457 (1840), the Bank of
Mobile drew a draft on the plaintiff bank for $213.50. The draft was later purchased by the defendant bank after it had been wrongfully altered so as to can
for the payment of $5,013.50 and it was paid by the plaintiff upon presentation.
It was held that the plaintiff bank could recover the funds paid by it in error.
27. The "Britton school" of writers seem to prefer the conclusion that § 62
has not changed the common law rule permitting recovery of money paid under
a mistake of fact upon a materially altered instrument, whether or not certified
and whether or not in the hands of a holder in due course, thus obviating the
necessity of distinguishing between payment and acceptance. See BRITTON, BILLS
AND NOTES § 140 (2d ed. 1961); BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES, AND CHECKS § 197a
(3d ed. 1928) ; BRADY, THE LAW OF FORGED AND ALTERED CHECKS § 98 (1925).
As Louisiana reached a position contrary to the common law prior to the NIL in
Louisiana Nat'l Bank v. Citizens' Bank, 28 La. Ann. 189 (1876), it is interesting
to speculate whether adoption of § 62 by La. Acts 1904, No. 64, had the effect
of continuing the rule of the Louisiana Nat'l Bank case. If this rule was continued in Louisiana, the distinction between payment and acceptance is particularly apt. See note 22 supra, and accompanying text.
28. See note 17 supra.
29. See Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal.
156, 4 P.2d 781 (1931) ; Comment, 31 YALE L.J. 522 (1922) ; cf. Steffen & Starr,
A Blue Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REv. 450, 477 (1935).
The assertion that the bank may protect itself by using a qualified acceptance
is negatived in the Uniform Commercial Code, which, in §§ 4-207(1) (dealing
with banks) and 3417(1) (dealing with all drawees), provides that any attempt
to avoid the warranty of no material alteration given by the holder of the instrument to the drawee through the use of a qualified acceptance, such as "payable
as originally drawn," will not be sufficient to impose on the holder in due course
the warranty of no material alteration where the holder took the draft after the
acceptance and presumably in reliance on it. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 3-117, comment 5.
30. See, e.g., Weiner v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives & Granting
Annuities, 160 Pa. Super. 320, 51 A.2d 385 (1947).
31. See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 31 (1937).
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form Commercial Code8" have afffmed thi§ ptsitilbh. The ltitti
states the rule in terms of a Warranty extended by hy prsb)ii
who obtains payment or certification 't the perso&if Who pays
or certifies that the instrument has not been mfatfially ialtered ;
but this warranty is not given by a hold± if 'due 6UfSb

t6 thd

atteptor With respect to an alteration made pribe to the ettification, if the holder took the instrument After the Ac~eptance,
Further, in accord with the instant case, any customer who obtains payment of an uncertified check warrants to the payordrawee that the instrument has not been materially altered, no
matter whether he is a holder in due course or not. Thus the
decision that the drawee may recover money paid on an uncertified materially altered cheek from the person who received pay-

ment, which places Louisiana in the apparent majority as stated
by the Restdtement of Restitutions,83 seems eminently correct.

Richard . Wi kis Jr.

PRESCRIPTION

-TEN-YEAR ACQuIsITWE PRESCkIPTIbN FOUIDED

ON WIFE'S CONVEYANCE 010 COMMUNIf IiM6VABts

In concursus proceedings to ascertain the proper parties to
whom mineral royalties should be paid, the primary issue for
the appellate court was whether the purchaser of community
Vr0
ty frohi a iatried Woman by ahi act of sale, Which oii
32. See UNrFoM Commnc-IAL CODE § 8417, which prfovides, in pa*t: "(1)
A&ny person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior ttansfe'ror wafrdiitd
to a person who in good faith pays ot accepts that ; (c) the instrument had

not been materially alteredi except that this *airanty is not given by a Bolder
in due course acting in good faith; . -. (iii) t6 the &ccetor of a draft *ith reslbetto an alteration made prior to the acceptance if the holder in due course took
the draft after the acceptance, even though the acceptance bpovitled 'pyabl6 as
originally drawn' or equivalent terms; or (iv) to the acceptor bf a dfaft *1th
respect to an alteration made after thd acceptime."
For a general commentary on the effect of the Uniform Commercial Code oil
Louisiana negotiable instruments law see Symposiubi i The Effe~t b the Adoption

Lat
of the Proposed Uniform Comrmercfal Code on the Nego'tiabl Intsubtst
of Louisiana: A Student Sym gosium; 16 LA, L; R&. 89 (1955);
33. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 81 (1937) ; Fidelity Nat'l Bank V; Vucl,
224 La. 124, 68. So. 2d 781 (1953) ; M Feitel House Wikinj Co. vi Citizens'
Bank & trust Co;, 159 La; 752 106 So. 292 (1925) ; Louisiank Nat'l Bank t.
Citizens' Bank, 28 La. Ann. 189 (1876) ; Merchants' Bank v. Exehange ,Bhk 16
La. 457 (1840).
1. The vendor had acquired the property durifig hei iaiirriagd by an act of
sale from her father, the act reciting a cash consideration. The lower couit Agred
with the vendee's position that the sale was in reality a donation and that, therefore, the property was her separate property and not community property. The

